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Abstract— This paper presents an overview of a Wireless 
Sensor and Actuator Network (WSAN) used to monitor an 
electrical power grid distribution infrastructure. The WSAN 
employs appropriate sensors to monitor key grid components, 
integrating both safety and security services, which improve 
the grid distribution dependability. The supported applications 
include, among others, video surveillance of remote secondary 
substations, which imposes special requirements from the 
point of view of quality of service and reliability. The paper 
presents the hardware and software architecture of the system 
together with performance results. 
Keywords-Wireless Sensor and Actuator Network, Power 
Grid Distribution Infrastructure, IEEE 802.11, DTSN, RPL. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The electrical power grid is a complex and critical 
infrastructure, which welcomes the deployment of extra 
technology to improve its dependability. Wireless Sensor 
and Actuator Networks (WSAN) can be an important part of 
the additional technological solutions used for that purpose. 
If deployed in key points of the grid they can provide 
important information to a central control system, whose 
operator can trigger the most appropriate actions to solve an 
existing problem or to avoid problems in the near future. An 
extra set of actuators included in the WSAN can further 
improve the capabilities of the network to deal with the 
problems. 
This paper presents research results from the introduction 
of WSAN in the distribution part of the power grid. The 
research was conducted within the WSAN4CIP (Wireless 
Sensor and Actuator Networks for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection) project, which is partially funded by the 
European Commission 7th Framework Program of Research. 
After the introduction, the second section of the paper 
illustrates the selected WSAN applications. The third section 
describes the sensor boards and the networking architecture 
of the solution, whereas section four introduces the work 
done on the routing and transport protocols as well as in the 
security aspects of the solution. Section five refers to the 
central part of the system, which interfaces the WSAN to the 
SCADA of the energy operator. The next two sections 
present the trial configuration and the performance results 
obtained with this solution. Finally the paper concludes with 
an evaluation of the technology and drawing of conclusions.  
II. WSAN APPLICATIONS FOR THE POWER GRID 
The electrical power grid distribution infrastructure is 
schematically shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Power grid distribution infrastructure 
The power grid distribution infrastructure mainly consists 
of a set of substations, Medium Voltage (MV) power lines 
connecting substations to Medium Voltage/Low Voltage 
(MV/LV) power transformers residing in the secondary 
substations and LV power lines from the secondary 
substations to the customers. Some industrial customers may 
also get direct MV power lines. Associated to this 
infrastructure we consider also the SCADA system, which is 
a supervisory control and data acquisition system dedicated 
to the infrastructure. Remote surveillance of the power grid 
is already done to some extent based on wired sensors. The 
use of wireless sensors can, however, lead to a more flexible 
and powerful protection scenario for the substations, power 
lines and power transformers. The deployment flexibility of 
WSAN allows capturing more status parameters than the 
currently deployed wired sensors and the wireless nature of 
the communication can contribute to avoid critical points of 
failure. 
In the WSAN4CIP project we focused into improving 
the dependability of the substation components, MV and LV 
power lines, and MV/LV power transformers in the 
secondary substations. We have defined solutions for the 
remote active monitoring of: i) substation circuit breaker 
trip coil status; ii) temperature of the substation power 
transformer oil, substation neutral reactance oil and 
substation neutral resistor coil box; iii) MV and LV power 
line current activity; iv) MV/LV power transformer hotspot 
detection; v) human activity in the secondary substation 
through the use of movement detectors and video cameras. 
All the monitored parameters and images are visualized at 
the SCADA system, through a special-purpose graphical 
user interface.  
In the circuit breaker trip coil scenario we consider a 
sensor and actuator for periodically evaluating the operating 
status of the circuit breaker trip coil element. The trip coil 
activates the circuit breaker when a 110V DC voltage is 
applied at its terminals, cutting the energy supply to the 
power line. It happens that after activating the circuit 
breaker there is a chance that the coil may be damaged and 
the circuit breaker will not function properly in the next 
event. This solution aims to check the working status of the 
trip coil in a pro-active way. A 5V DC voltage will be 
applied every 60 minute by an actuator. The magnetic field 
generated by the coil will be measured by a Hall-effect 
transistor. In the event of failure, meaning that no magnetic 
field is detected when a 5V DC voltage is applied, the 
sensor will report the failure back to the network. This 
solution also allows for on demand testing. 
The temperature sensor probes to measure the 
temperature in the substation transformers, neutral 
reactances and neutral resistor coil boxes are placed on the 
external side of the metallic oil tank, firmly and thermally 
attached to the tank external wall. The sensor probes are 
insulated from the external environment with thermal foam. 
On normal status a measure will be taken every minute. The 
temperature sensor also allows for on demand temperature 
reading. 
The MV power line scenario aims to monitor the status 
of an MV power line section. It is therefore possible to 
know centrally the location of a power line failure. The 
power line chosen is a medium voltage 15kV line that feeds 
a set of MV/LV power transformers in secondary 
substations. The line topology is a tree shape with several 
leaves, the leaves being the secondary substations (see 
Figure 1). The physical measurement to be done is the 
electrical current flowing through the line; a current 
transformer is used to measure its value and to derive a 
parasitic power source for the wireless sensor, reducing the 
power constrains on the wireless protocols through this 
energy harvesting technique (Figure 2, bottom-right). The 
current sensor samples the current on the line every second. 
We use the multi-hop wireless communications link 
built in the previous scenario to upload a video image feed 
of the secondary substation to the network when movement 
is detected. At the same time an infrared thermo sensor 
attached to the camera will sweep the power transformer 
critical elements, like the main switch board, for hotspots 
(Figure 2, bottom left). The detection of a hotspot will 
trigger an alarm into the network. This scenario also 
includes an actuator, which turns on the lights in the 
secondary substation. Thus, albeit the camera shall be night 
and day capable, the user can get a better and color video 
stream even at night.  
The requirement for video transmission and the long 
distances between MV power line towers place additional 
requirements in terms of the communications and 
processing capabilities of the WSAN nodes. We have 
defined two sensor mote architectures with different 
processing power, which can be used in all these 
applications and that can run a standard operating system 
like Linux. Communication interfaces capable of connecting 
to powerful communication networks like Wi-Fi are also 
part of the mote architecture.  
The energy supply to the WSAN nodes is obtained from 
power supplies in the substation and secondary substation 
installation and also from the power lines, although in the 
latter case the voltages are too high to be used directly by 
the WSAN nodes, which requires the use of intelligent 
energy harvesting techniques.  
III. WIRELESS SENSOR BOARDS AND SOFTWARE OF THE 
SOLUTION 
This section presents an overview of the wireless sensor 
boards and the software of the solution. 
A. Wireless Sensor Boards 
Regarding wireless sensor board hardware, the project 
WSAN4CIP has integrated two solutions: one based on a 
Silex SX-560 core1 and a second solution based on a Beagle 
Board2. While video compression at the secondary substation 
requires a more powerful processing node such as the 
Beagle, scalar sensor nodes can be based on a less powerful 
board such as the Silex SX-560. The Beagle board is also 
able to support a secure operating system. The inclusion of 
two different solutions allows also the demonstration of a 
heterogeneous scenario. 
For the Silex SX-560 solution the PCB designed at 
INOV (Figure 2, top) includes a common voltage converter 
able to generate 3.3 V DC to feed the Silex and 5 V DC to 
feed the USB interface (considered a part of the Sensor 
Interface Unit) based on an input of 6-20 V DC. The 
differences between the WSAN nodes concern the Energy 
Unit and Sensor Interface Unit, which depend on the 
deployment spot and attached sensor, respectively. The 
Energy Units are able to convert from the external power 
source (either MV power-line energy harvesting or 230 V 
AC mains) to the 6-20 V DC input. Similarly, a 230 V AC to 
5 V DC adapter was used for the Beagle nodes. 
                                                        
1 http://www.silexeurope.com/en/home/products/wireless-modules/ 
sx-560.html 
2 http://beagleboard.org/ 
The used WSAN radio technology was IEEE 802.11g. 
The choice was based on the longer communications range 
and higher data rates required for multi-hop video 
transmission from the secondary substation. Although the 
consumption of IEEE 802.11g is higher than for low power 
radio technologies such as IEEE 802.15.4, the specific 
characteristics of the target application allow the WSAN 
nodes at the primary and secondary substations to be fed 
from the 230 V AC mains (see above), while the MV power-
line sensors may resort to energy harvesting from the MV 
line current. 
 
Figure 2. Top: Silex sensor with PCB; Bottom-left: Sensor with webcam, 
infrared camera, LED light and movement sensor; Bottom-right: Sensor 
hanging on a 15 KV line, harvesting energy from the line.  
 
B. Software  
The software modules of the WSAN node are depicted in 
Figure 3. The selected Operating System is Linux, which is 
supported by the Silex SX-560 module. In the Beagle 
solution, Linux runs on top of a secure microkernel [1] that 
controls the access to all critical resources of the WSAN 
node.  
The main software modules of the WSAN node are the 
following:  
• WSAN Sensor/Actuator Application Logic: 
Application logic of the WSAN node, 
managing sensors, actuators and 
communications. 
• Dependable Protocol Stack: The Routing and 
Transport protocols. The transport layer 
consists of a secured version of the Distributed 
Transport for Sensor Networks (DTSN), while 
routing consists of a secure version of the 
Routing Protocol for Low power and Lossy 
Networks (RPL).  
• Sensor/Actuator Device Driver: Software 
that provides access to each type of 
sensor/actuator.  
• Management Information Base (MIB): 
Configuration parameters of the WSAN nodes.  
• Secure Microkernel: trusted software 
underlying the operating system, which 
controls access to all resources of the WSAN 
node. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Software architecture of WSAN node.  
IV. ROUTING PROTOCOL, TRANSPORT PROTOCOL AND 
PROTOCOL SECURITY 
The routing and transport protocols, which constitute the 
Dependable Protocol Stack, are especially important to 
increase the dependability of the solution. Although the RPL 
and DTSN protocols already existed, new security 
extensions were added for use in the WSAN4CIP Power 
Grid, which significantly contributed to enhance the 
reliability of the protocol stack. 
A. Secure RPL 
In the WSAN4CIP solution, we adopted RPL as the 
routing protocol, which is developed by the ROLL Working 
Group of the IETF. The RPL specification is currently in 
draft status [2], however, it is expected to become an RFC 
soon. RPL is a distance vector routing protocol optimized for 
multipoint-to-point and point-to-multipoint communications 
within constrained networks. Neighboring nodes in the 
network exchange routing control information with each 
other, and each node selects a set of, so called, parent nodes. 
The resulting parent-child relationships are represented by a 
Destination Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG) 
rooted at the sink (or the gateway to some wired backbone). 
Each node then selects a preferred parent, where the 
selection is guided by the objective function in use. 
Objective functions are not defined in the main RPL 
specification, but in separate documents (see e.g., [3]), and 
they can take into account hop count, node rank, link quality, 
and battery status information. Once the routing topology is 
established, upward (from the sensors to the sink) and 
downward (from the sink to the sensors) routes are selected 
along the edges of the DODAG. 
A DODAG is advertised in DODAG Information Object 
(DIO) messages. Among other things, DIO messages contain 
a DODAG version number and a node rank value. The 
version number is used to determine the freshness of the 
routing information, while the node rank value represents the 
distance of the sending node from the DODAG root. 
Normally, the version number is increased by the DODAG 
root when it wants to initiate the re-generation of the routing 
topology, and it remains unchanged in the DIO messages 
sent by the DODAG nodes. In contrast to this, the rank value 
is updated by each DODAG node to correctly represent the 
node’s distance from the root. 
There exists an RPL security framework [4], however, 
the security services of that framework are supposed to 
provide protection only against an external attacker. In 
particular, the current RPL security framework does not 
prevent the DODAG nodes from manipulating the version 
number and the rank value in DIO messages. Unfortunately, 
if a misbehaving DODAG node increases the version 
number, then the routing topology is re-calculated and the 
misbehaving node becomes the DODAG root. This allows 
the misbehaving node to divert the entire data traffic in the 
network towards itself and control all communications in the 
network. Another problem is that a misbehaving node can 
maliciously decrease the rank value in DIO messages. By 
doing so, the misbehaving node may become the parent of all 
of its neighbors, and again divert a large part of the data 
traffic towards itself. In order to prevent the illegitimate 
increase of the version number and the illegitimate decrease 
of the rank value in DIO messages, we propose novel 
security extensions to the RPL protocol. The detailed 
description of those extensions can be found in [5]. 
B. Secure DTSN 
The DTSN protocol [6][7] was intended for critical data 
transfer requiring end-to-end full reliability, in the fashion of 
TCP. Differently from the latter, for sake of improving 
energy efficiency in WSANs, DTSN employs a Selective 
Repeat Automatic Repeat reQuest (SR-ARQ) using negative 
acknowledgments (NACK). Positive acknowledgment 
packets (ACK) are also used to prevent the situations where 
the complete message or its last packet is lost (which cannot 
be detected solely based on NACKs). Both NACKs and 
ACKs are to be sent by the receiver only upon request by the 
sender (Explicit Acknowledgment Request – EAR), which 
can be piggy-backed in data packets at the end of each 
acknowledgement window (a transmission window consists 
of one or more acknowledgement windows). Intermediate 
nodes can also retransmit packets from their packet caches 
upon NACK interception, avoiding costly-end-to-end 
retransmissions. 
In DTSN, a session is a source/destination relationship 
univocally identified by the tuple <Source Address, 
Destination Address, Application Identifier, Session 
Number>, designated the session identifier (ܵ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊ܫܦ ).  
The Session Number works like a version number of the 
session. In case the receiver detects a change in the Session 
Number while the session is still active, it resets the session 
state, reporting which packets were missing from the 
previous Session Number, if any. This functionality was used 
in WSAN4CIP in order to establish a trade-off between 
fragment recovery delay and frame quality, with each video 
frame being transmitted with a different Session Number. 
This functionality is especially useful for the transmission of 
multi-layered video. 
As shown in [8], reliable transport protocols are 
vulnerable to control packet manipulation attacks. In 
particular, a forged or altered ACK packet creates the false 
impression that data packets have been received by the 
destination while in reality they may have been lost, causing 
sender and destination to become out-of-sync with respect to 
the status of the session. On the other hand, NACK packets 
may be used to trigger useless retransmissions, leading to 
denial of service or at least to faster draining of the WSAN 
node batteries. To implement security at the lower layers is 
also energetically inefficient when not all applications have 
security requirements. These factors prompt the development 
of security mechanisms at the transport layer.  
Though DTSN basically operates end-to-end, 
intermediate node caching can significantly improve its 
energy efficiency. This active participation of intermediate 
nodes means that they must be able to process and in some 
cases change the contents of DTSN headers, constraining the 
use of security solely between sender and receiver. The 
DTSN security extension proposed in [9] prevents the 
transport session to become out-of-sync through data, ACK 
and NACK packet authentication, using symmetric 
cryptography schemes exclusively. 
The general idea of the security mechanism is the 
following: We assume that the source and the destination 
share a secret, which we call the session master key, and we 
denote it by ܭ. From this, they both derive an ACK master 
key ܭ஺஼௄ and a NACK master key ܭே஺஼௄ for the session as 
follows: 
ܭ஺஼௄  =  ܴܲܨ(ܭ;  “ܣܥܭ ݉ܽݏݐ݁ݎ ݇݁ݕ”;  ܵ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊ܫܦ) 
ܭே஺஼௄  =  ܴܲܨ(ܭ;  “ܰܣܥܭ ݉ܽݏݐ݁ݎ ݇݁ݕ”;  ܵ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊ܫܦ) 
where ܴܲܨ  is the pseudo-random function defined in 
[10] and ܵ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊ܫܦ  is the DTSN session identifier. The 
length of K, ܭ஺஼௄ , and ܭே஺஼௄  is 128 bits each. Each data 
packet is extended with two MAC (Message Authentication 
Code) values computed over the packet itself with two 
different keys, an ACK key and a NACK key, both specific 
to the data packet and known only to the source and the 
destination. The ACK key ܭ஺஼௄
(௡)  and NACK key ܭே஺஼௄(௡)  for 
the ݊-th packet of the session (i.e., whose sequence number 
is ݊) are computed as follows: 
ܭ஺஼௄
(௡) =  ܴܲܨ(ܭ஺஼௄;  “݌݁ݎ ݌ܽܿ݇݁ݐ ܣܥܭ ݇݁ݕ”;  ݊)  
ܭே஺஼௄
(௡) =  ܴܲܨ(ܭே஺஼௄;  “݌݁ݎ ݌ܽܿ݇݁ݐ ܰܣܥܭ ݇݁ݕ”;  ݊)  
When the destination wants to send an ACK referring to 
this data packet, it reveals its ACK key; similarly, when it 
wants to signal that this data packet is missing, it reveals its 
NACK key. Now, any intermediate node that has the data 
packet in question can verify if the NACK is authentic by 
checking if the appropriate MAC verifies correctly with the 
given key. As only the source and the destination can 
produce the right keys, but the source never reveals them, the 
intermediate node can be sure that the control information 
must have been sent by the destination. Besides, intermediate 
nodes manage the cache following a strict FIFO policy and 
thus they never delete cached data packets upon reception of 
a NACK or ACK. Regarding end-to-end synchronization, the 
source only deletes data packets from its transmission 
window if the appropriate MAC matches the ACK keys in 
control packets. A side effect of the scheme is that the MAC 
values provide end-to-end protection, meaning that the 
destination can check the authenticity and integrity of each 
received data packet, which is also a desirable feature.  
V. GATEWAY BETWEEN THE WSAN AND SCADA 
The substation devices are nowadays monitored and 
controlled through the Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) system. The WSAN is integrated with 
this existing system by means of a SCADA/WSAN 
Gateway, in order to provide a unified power distribution 
infrastructure interface to the human operators (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Integration between WSAN and SCADA system.  
The SCADA protocol architecture is generic enough to 
be operated in an Internet Protocol (IP) environment on top 
of different network technologies such as Ethernet and 
SONET/SDH. However, the WSAN presents a specific 
networking environment where the energy and bandwidth 
optimization requirements are often incompatible with the 
request/response philosophy behind SCADA. These 
differences lead to the need of translating SCADA 
procedures to WSAN procedures and vice versa, which is the 
purpose of the SCADA/WSAN gateway. 
The gateway consists of a PC equipped with an Ethernet 
interface. This Ethernet interface interconnects it to the 
SCADA system and to the WSAN sink node. The latter 
consists of a of a Silex SX-560 board. The WSAN sink node 
is the main destination of sensor data and main source of 
queries and configuration/command requests. 
From the point of view of the SCADA system, the 
SCADA/WSAN gateway behaves as a database of sensing 
and management data that responds to its queries about the 
status of WSAN devices. The application interface for these 
queries is based on Web Services [11], with the gateway 
implementing the server side. On the other hand, the 
SCADA system implements the server side of Web Services 
related with urgent asynchronous notifications such as 
alarms. The use of the Web Service interface performs an 
adequate mapping of the SCADA data access mechanisms, 
which follows a client/server paradigm. 
The main functions of the SCADA/WSAN gateway are: 
 To translate between WSAN messages and Web 
Services and vice-versa. 
 To keep the log of WSAN activity. 
 To detect WSAN topology changes and initiate 
route recovery by means of the RPL interface.  
VI. TRIAL DEPLOYMENT 
A proof-of-concept demonstrator was deployed at EDP 
Distribuição3 premises, more precisely at the São Sebastião 
primary substation, located in the neighborhood of the city 
of Setúbal, in the west of Portugal. The São Sebastião 
substation provides electric energy to the Setúbal region. 
The EDP demonstrator encompasses the sections of the 
electricity distribution infrastructure, similar to the depiction 
in Figure 1. 
The type and number of sensors deployed in the trial 
were as follows: 
 Trip-coil SX-560 sensor/actuator nodes : 2 
 Neutral Resistance SX-560 temperature sensor nodes: 1 
 Neutral Reactance SX-560 temperature sensor nodes: 1 
 HV/MV Transformer SX-560 temperature sensor 
nodes: 1 
 Neutral Resistance Beagle board temperature sensor 
nodes: 1 
 Neutral Reactance Beagle board temperature sensor 
nodes: 1 
 HV/MV Transformer Beagle board temperature sensor 
nodes: 1 
 LV current measurement sensor nodes: 5 
 MV current measurement sensor nodes: 1 
 Secondary substation surveillance and hotspot detection 
Beagle board sensor node: 1 
 Extra SX-560 relay node to bridge the distance from the 
power lines to the secondary substation: 1 
 
The SCADA system and WSAN Gateway were both 
deployed at the São Sebastião substation – as would be the 
case in a real system –, though in this case it remained 
logically separate from the EDP private network for security 
                                                        
3 EDP Distribuição is the main company that carries out the 
function of electricity distribution operator in mainland 
Portugal. 
reasons. External Internet connectivity to the SCADA server 
was provided in order to allow most of the functional and 
performance tests to be performed by the project partners 
from their own premises. 
VII. PERFORMANCE RESULTS 
Tests were conducted in the WSAN4CIP trial network in 
order to assess the performance of the supported services and 
compliance with the requirements provided by EDP 
Distribuição. Due to the high performance demand of multi-
hop video transmission and the fact that video was 
transmitted on top of the DTSN transport protocol, the video 
performance tests are presented separately from the other 
applications. 
A. Scalar Sensor Tests 
For the current measurement tests, extra current was 
externally injected in the LV lines by the EDP technicians 
and the sensor reports were confronted against the known 
current injection values.  
For the trip-coil, on-demand tests were performed while 
the trip-coil was operational. Then, the 110 V terminal was 
disconnected from the trip-coil to check whether the 
malfunction was automatically detected. The on-demand test 
was also repeated under this condition.  
For the intrusion and hotspot detection tests, the 
respective situations were simulated by the EDP and INOV 
team. The tests entailed the transmission of images from the 
LV/MV power transformer to the primary substation. For the 
hotspot detection, a soldering iron was placed in front of the 
camera, while for intrusion detection, a member of the EDP 
team simulated intrusions in the secondary substations.  
The measurement precision test results are listed in Table 
I and Table II. It should be noted that these results already 
have sensor calibration into account. Regarding the 
temperature measurements, the precision is high, with an 
average error of 1% and maximum of 3%. For the power line 
current measurements, the average error was 4.58% with 
peaks of 10.83%. This precision is enough to detect 
breakdown spots in the power-lines as well as to provide 
coarse reports about the distribution of current consumption 
within the EDP network. The remaining components feature 
a high precision. 
TABLE I.  TEMPERATURE AND CURRENT PRECISION EVALUATION. 
Application Number of Trials 
Average 
Error 
Maximum 
Error 
Standard 
Deviation 
Power 
Transformer Oil 
Temperature4 
10 1.0% 3.0% 0.4% 
Power Line 
Current 20 4.6% 10.9% 3.1% 
 
                                                        
4 Temperature precision measurements were similar for the 
Neutral Reactance and Neutral Resistance components, 
since the sensor node is the same. 
TABLE II.  EVENT PRECISION EVALUATION. 
Application Number of Trials 
Measurement 
Errors 
Success 
Rate 
Trip Coil 24 0 100% 
Intrusion 
Detection 11 0 100 % 
Hotspot 
Detection 10 0 100 % 
 
The delay performance results are listed in Table III. 
TABLE III.  DELAY EVALUATION. 
Application 
Average 
Delay 
Standard 
Deviation 
(%) 
Delay Bound 
Requirement 
On-demand Trip Coil 
RTT5 20.9 ms 3.9 ms < 2 s 
Power Transformer 
Oil Temperature RTT 18.4 ms 4.8 ms < 2 s 
Neutral Reactance Oil 
Temperature RTT 21.9 ms 5.4 ms < 2 s 
Neutral Resistor Coil 
Box Temperature 
RTT 
19.9 ms 6.3 ms < 2 s 
Power Line Current 
Measurement (1 hop) 21.5 ms 5.1 ms < 10 s 
Power Line Current 
Measurement (5 
hops) 
120.2 ms 10.0 ms < 10 s 
Intrusion Detection 2.1 s 1.1 s < 10 s 
Hotspot Detection 2.2 s 0.4 s < 10 s 
 
The power-line sensing delay was measured at two 
different nodes, located at 1 hop and 5 hops from the sink. At 
5 hops, the delay was still a small fraction of the allowed 
maximum. Intrusion and hotspot detection figures are 
relative to the sensor node located at the secondary 
substation, which was positioned at approximately 7 hops 
from the sink node. 
Regarding packet losses, no packets were lost during the 
scalar sensor tests. 
B. Video Performance 
The results of the video performance evaluation tests are 
listed in Table IV. Results are presented for both DTSN and 
UDP, in both cases running over the IP protocol. UDP is 
currently the de facto transport protocol for delay-sensitive 
multimedia data, although it provides no reliability support. 
As can be seen, both UDP and DTSN present similar 
delay and jitter performance, being able to comply with the 
requirements defined by EDP. DTSN achieves lower frame 
losses (0%) due to its error recovery mechanism, while 
achieving slightly lower delay. Although neither of the tested 
transport protocols is able to provide the required channel 
capacity of 768 Kbit/s, both are able to support the required 
resolution at a frame rate that is even higher than the one 
defined therein. The difference towards the required channel 
                                                        
5 Round Trip Time. 
capacity is also not too significant, being respectively 11.5% 
and 12.5% for UDP and DTSN. 
TABLE IV.  VIDEO STREAMING EVALUATION. 
TransportProtoc
ol 
Paramete
r 
Averag
e 
Standar
d 
Deviatio
n 
Requiremen
t 
UDP 
 
Delay 183 ms 35 ms < 10 s 
Jitter 10 ms 4 ms < 200 ms 
Throughpu
t 
233 
Kbit/s - - 
Video 
frames lost 0.83% 2% < 2% 
Channel 
capacity 
680 
Kbit/s 
191 
Kbit/s 768 Kbit/s 
DTSN 
 
Delay 176 ms 37 ms < 10 s 
Jitter 11 ms 5 ms < 200 ms 
Throughpu
t 
243 
Kbit/s - - 
Video 
frames lost 0.00% 0.00% < 2% 
Channel 
Capacity 
672 
Kbit/s 
188 
Kbit/s 768 Kbit/s 
 
DTSN was separately tested with and without security 
functions enabled. For the unsecure configuration, DTSN 
was tested in a linear 3-hop topology, with a physical Packet 
Error Rate (PER) of 5% being introduced. The DTSN 
transmission window configuration was three 
acknowledgement windows of eight packets each. The 
results are listed in Table V for the full reliability scenario 
with different packet sizes, attesting the significant impact of 
intermediate node caching. Since it avoids end-to-end 
retransmissions, the caching mechanism is able to reduce the 
round-trip-time as well as to minimize the overhead, which 
leads to a throughput increment. The higher the packet loss 
rate, the higher the improvement using transport caching. 
TABLE V.  DTSN PERFORMANCE WITH DISABLED SECURITY. 
Packet Size 
(bytes) 
Throughput w/o Cache 
(kbit/s) 
Throughput w/ Cache 
(kbit/s) 
200 276.72 311.71 
500 546.63 802.01 
1000 870.51 1212.12 
1300 901.41 1485.61 
 
The impact of security was also evaluated in terms of the 
maximum achievable throughput. Experiments were carried 
out with a 7-hop topology where the sink node was a PC. 
The packet size was 1400 bytes. The results are listed in 
Table VI. 
The impact of security can clearly be seen, especially 
when the destination of data is a sensor node. The 
performance increase introduced by caching can partially 
compensate the inefficiency introduced by the security 
mechanism, but only when the caching mechanism is 
effective (i.e., for PER greater or equal than 5%), leading to 
higher throughput compared with the end-to-end solution 
even if without security. 
TABLE VI.  DTSN PERFORMANCE IN A 7-HOP TOPOLOGY. 
Packet 
Error 
Rate (%) 
Throughput (kbit/s) 
w/o Cache w/o 
Security 
w/ Cache w/o 
Security 
w/Cache 
w/ Security 
Sensor 

PC 
PC 

Sensor 
Sensor 

PC 
PC 

Sensor 
Sensor 

PC 
PC 

Sensor 
0 1112 1009 1119 1084 1098 1007 
5 782 655 865 952 810 778 
10 699 584 719 850 705 703 
 
VIII. TECHNOLOGY EVALUATION  
This section presents the technology evaluation on the 
deployment of the WSAN4CIP solution in the EDP 
electricity distribution network, taking also a business-
oriented perspective besides the technical perspective. These 
conclusions are based both on the results of the WSAN4CIP 
trial and on data from EDP. 
A. Scalability of the solution 
Taking into account the throughput provided by IEEE 
802.11g, the traffic patterns as well as the deployment 
constraints of the solution, it is clear that the main scalability 
challenges are related with the transmission of video from 
the secondary substations through the MV lines to the 
gateway located at the primary substation. In fact, the 
substation traffic generated by the sensors is very low and 
has to cross at most 2 hops, therefore it is not a scalability 
issue. Also the current measurements at the MV towers, 
besides presenting a low data rate, can be additionally 
aggregated along the subnetwork tree in order to reduce the 
traffic even more, which means that this is also not a 
scalability problem. 
The number of hops between the secondary substation 
and the WSAN Gateway varies greatly in the different lines 
along the country. Normally, the lines present a tree topology 
in which the secondary substations (MV/LV power 
transformers) are located along the MV lines. This means 
that images transmitted from the secondary substations 
traverse from a small number of hops to a maximum number, 
which can be above 100 hops. Experiments have shown that 
the data rate of power-line sensor nodes is reduced with the 
increase in the number of hops, though the reduction is 
nonlinear. Simulations have shown that under acceptable 
link quality, several video streams can be reliably transmitted 
at least up to 70 hops, though in real conditions the feasible 
number of hops would probably be reduced. For 
transmission along a large number of hops, alternative 
solutions would have to be implemented. One possibility is 
to transmit the video to nearby gateways that can dispatch 
the traffic through a broadband access technology such as 
ADSL, HFC, WiMAX, LTE, for example. 
The integrated intrusion detection solution allows the 
video streaming to be activated only upon detection of the 
intrusion event, which may be triggered by the Passive 
Infrared (PIR) movement detector. A similar solution was 
implemented regarding hotspot detection and Infrared (IR) 
video streaming, in which activation of the video stream is 
triggered based on a temperature threshold. Since these 
events are rare and are very unlikely to occur simultaneously 
(at least in significant numbers), the selected technology and 
deployment architecture are enough to support these 
services. However, a commercial solution would require 
additional software functionality that was not implemented 
in the prototype, namely the capability to alternate between 
video streams, while temporarily switching-off the streams 
that are not being visualized at the moment. This would 
significantly increase the number of intrusion detection and 
hotspot events that can be simultaneously monitored. 
B. Impact on business 
When evaluating the advantages of the proposed system 
on EDP’s business, it must be taken into account that as an 
energy distribution company, EDP’s objectives go beyond 
getting financial profits. EDP has also an important social 
role. Hence, although it was not possible to get precise 
figures on the financial impact of the proposed solution, the 
following advantages can be readily identified: 
1. The timely detection of a trip-coil break down will 
ensure that the repair is done before the protected equipment 
(e.g. neutral reactance/resistance and ultimately the MV/HV 
power transformer) is damaged, preventing long blackouts 
that would affect the population of Setúbal (the nearby city 
in this deployment) as well as industrial clients. 
2. The timely detection of a neutral 
resistance/reactance malfunction will avoid that the protected 
HV/MV power transformer is damaged upon the occurrence 
of a short circuit in the MV lines. 
3. The quick detection and localization of a problem in 
some segment of the power-lines will speed-up the repair, 
minimizing the time that the clients will remain without 
energy. 
4. The timely detection of a malfunction on the 
MV/LV power transformers will minimize the damage and 
allow a quick repair, minimizing the impact on the clients. 
5. The surveillance of the secondary substations will 
discourage theft of equipment or vandalism activities, which 
will also improve the service offered to EDP clients. 
IX. CONCLUSION  
This paper has presented a WSAN for monitoring and 
increasing the dependability of a power grid distribution 
infrastructure. Requirements of the power distribution 
infrastructure such as transmission ranges and throughput 
have led to an IEEE 802.11g solution coupled with energy 
harvesting to recharge the WSAN node batteries in places 
where they cannot be directly fed from the power 
infrastructure. On the other hand, dependability requirements 
have led to special reliability and security mechanisms being 
embedded in the transport and routing protocols. 
A pilot system was deployed for a trial in the power 
distribution grid in the region of Setúbal, Portugal. 
Performance results indicate that the proposed architecture is 
able to meet the application requirements.  
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